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TREATY SEVEN AND GUARANTEED 
REPRESENTATION 
HOW TREATY RIGHTS CAN EVOLVE INTO 
PARLIAMENTARY SEATS 
KIERA L. LADNER 
Most of the Canadian plains region is cov-
ered by the "Numbered Treaties" negotiated 
in the 1870s between the government of the 
Dominion of Canada, acting for the British 
Crown, and the nations whose territories en-
compassed the area. Even at the time that the 
treaties were negotiated, the various signato-
ries had different assumptions about what they 
actually meant. During the ensuing century and 
more that the treaties have existed, their mean-
ings have been reinterpreted. With the repa-
triation of the Canadian constitution in 1982, 
Kiera L. Ladner is a doctoral student in political science 
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giving treaty rights constitutional status and 
protection from the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, the actual guarantees of the trea-
ties have often been interpreted in a manner 
inconsistent with current government policy 
and quite possibly in a way that none of the 
treaty negotiators for the Crown could have 
imagined, let alone predicted, in the 1870s. 
Although the Crown's prime objective was to 
avoid American-style "Indian wars" by secur-
ing promises of peace from the First Nations' 
leaders and to negotiate the surrender of lands 
that could then be parceled out to incoming 
Euro-Canadian settlers, the texts of the trea-
ties did promise the Indigenous parties sover-
eignty on their remaining territory, and 
particularly in the case of Treaty Seven, es-
tablished that Indigenous leaders should share 
the responsibility for maintaining peace and 
order in the region. While it is always difficult 
to interpret a document in the light of com-
pletely altered circumstances, I make the ar-
gument that Treaty Seven, at least, may be 
legitimately interpreted in such a way as to 
provide for guaranteed representation, at the 
federal level, for the First Nations that were 
parties to the treaty. 
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Although a number of studies have been 
conducted during the past several years sug-
gesting that guaranteed parliamentary repre-
sentation for Aboriginal peoples is compatible 
with the Canadian electoral system, others 
have suggested that such particularistic repre-
sentation-giving special electoral rights to 
one particular group-is unconstitutional. The 
lack of consensus in the existing literature 
about the constitutionality of guaranteed Ab-
original representation may be because all of 
the studies have focused on integrating Ab-
original representation within the existing 
electoral scheme. Like Iris Marion Young, most 
scholars have conceptualized guaranteed rep-
resentation as a means to rectify past injus-
tices and inadequacies in the Canadian 
political system, but ihhey had examined guar-
anteed representation as a pre-existing right 
of Aboriginal peoples from before the repa-
triation of the constitution they might have 
arrived at different, more consistent conclu-
sions.1 
In this paper I argue that guaranteed parlia-
mentary representation can legitimately be 
derived from the peace and good order clause 
that appears in the Numbered Treaties. In 
Treaty Seven (as in all the Numbered Trea-
ties) the peace and good order or "mutual" 
clause reads as follows: 
And the undersigned Blackfeet, Blood, 
Piegan [sic] and Sarcee Head Chiefs and 
Minor Chiefs, and Stony [sic] Chiefs and 
Councilors on their own behalf and on be-
half of all other Indians inhabiting the Tract 
within ceded do hereby solemnly promise 
and engage to strictly observe this Treaty, 
and also to conduct and behave themselves 
as good and loyal subjects of Her Majesty 
the Queen. They promise and engage that 
they will maintain peace and good order 
between each other and between themselves 
and other tribes of Indians, and between 
themselves and others of Her Majesty's sub-
jects, whether Indians, Half Breeds or 
Whites, now inhabiting or hereafter to in-
habit, any part of the said ceded tractj and 
that they will not molest the person or 
property of any inhabitant of such ceded 
tract, or the property of Her Majesty the 
Queen, or interfere with or trouble any per-
son, passing or traveling through the said 
tract or any part thereof, and that they will 
assist the officers of Her Majesty in bring-
ing to justice and punishment any Indian 
offending against the stipulation of this 
Treaty, or infringing the laws in force in 
the country so ceded. 2 
Because it is impossible to examine the 
mutual or peace and order clause in each of 
the western treaties, I have chosen to focus on 
Treaty Number Seven, covering southern 
Alberta, which was negotiated and signed by 
Lieutenant-Governor David Laird, Lieutenant-
Colonel James MacLeod, and representatives 
of the Siksika, North Peigan, Blood, Sarcee, 
and Stoney First Nations at Blackfoot Cross-
ing in September 1877.3 Since my own re-
search has so far focused only on the Siksika, 
North Peigan, and Blood First Nations, I have 
restricted my discussion only to these three sig-
natories, though further research will probably 
show that the same arguments can be made for 
the Stoney and Sarcee nations as well. 
I have examined not only the written words 
of the treaty but also the intentions and under-
standing of each party (the Queen in Right of 
Canada, Siksika, Peigan, and Blood). This pro-
vides a fuller understanding of what each party 
actually meant by this clause in the treaty. This 
is especially important because all of the his-
torical documents have been written by only 
one party to the treaty, the one that had the 
most to gain in the writing of such documents. 
Not only are there no written documents ar-
ticulating an "Indian" understanding of the 
treaty, but problems of translation render the 
words of the treaty itself suspect as represent-
ing the "Indian" point of view. 
THE PRE-TREATY UNDERSTANDING 
By 15 July 1870, when the government of 
Canada assumed jurisdiction over the North-
West Territories and began treaty negotiations 
there, its Indian policy had long been estab-
lished. The Crown, represented first by the 
colonial authories and then by the govern-
ment of the Dominion of Canada, had been 
negotiating various kinds of treaties with Ab-
original nations in North America for more 
than two hundred years and had established 
the conditions by which Indian lands were to 
be obtained. In the Royal Proclamation of 7 
October 1763, King George III declared that 
all land held by or reserved for the "Nations 
or Tribes of Indians," could only be "ceded or 
purchased" by the Crown. Thus, the Royal 
Proclamation set in motion a treaty-making 
process by which the government secured 
ownership to the land. The Royal Proclama-
tion states that, "if at any time any of the said 
Indians should be inclined to dispose of said 
Lands, the same shall be purchased only for 
Us, in our Name, at some public Meeting or 
Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for 
the Purpose."4 
Although the Dominion of Canada had ac-
quired the North-West Territories from the 
Hudson's Bay Company, Canada did not have 
title to the land itself, and the Dominion's 
"control" of the territories was being threat-
ened by American expansionism. At the end 
of the American Civil War in 1865, Canada 
faced an extremely well armed neighbor that 
was expanding westward at an alarming rate, 
and whose citizens were "eyeing the fate of the 
Red and Saskatchewan River districts with in-
terest."5 As Leroy Little Bear explains, 
The United States was expanding very rap-
idly westward, and Canada and Britain were 
trying to slow that expansion down, and 
they were trying to limit the United States 
as much as possible. So when the United 
States was expanding westward, Canada had 
to run westward, so to speak, and secure Brit-
ish Columbia so that British Columbia 
would not join or be annexed by the United 
States .... In the race westward, of course, 
the "come on" item for British Columbia 
joining Confederation was the building of 
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the rail road. But then the government says, 
"Hey we forgot about those Indians out 
there. We have to secure the peace and 
goodwill of those Indians."6 
Not only did the government have to se-
cure peaceful relations with the Aboriginal 
nations in the west, they needed their land, 
land upon which to build the railway and the 
"national dream." Thus, the Treaties enabled 
the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway, 
and "enable[dl the Government to throw open 
for settlement any portion of the land which 
might be susceptible of improvement and prof-
itable occupation."7 
Sir John A. Macdonald, one of the "Fathers 
of Confederation" and Canada's first prime 
minister, envisioned a Canada stretching from 
sea to sea. Thus his government needed trea-
ties that would ensure geographic unity, assert 
ownership over the land, and clear the way for 
colonists, all aspects of Macdonald's "national 
dream." At the same time, however, the Ab-
original peoples of the N orth-West still repre-
sented a considerable military threat to the new 
Dominion's ambitions, and Macdonald also 
needed treaties of "Peace and Friendship" 
with the powerful Aboriginal nations. The 
ongoing Indian wars south of the border were 
examples of what Canada did not want, while 
events closer to home underlined the need to 
conclude peace. The Riel Rebellion in 
Manitoba in 1869, in which the Metis or "Half 
Breed" community successfully demanded a 
recognition of its rights from the new Domin-
ion of Canada; the Cypress Hills Massacre in 
1873, in which American whiskey traders in 
Saskatchewan murdered a group of Assini-
boines, sparking the formation of the North-
West Mounted Police to maintain order; the 
arrival of Sitting Bull and his followers in the 
Cypress Hills following the defeat of Custer in 
1876; and the impressive retreat of the Nez 
Perce toward the Canadian border in 1877 all 
alarmed the Canadian government. Warnings 
from missionaries such as the Reverend George 
McDougall, who told of escalating violence 
toward whites, or Father Constantine Scollen, 
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who wrote that "the Sioux Indians, now at 
war with the Americans, have sent a message 
to the Blackfeet Tribe, asking them to make 
an alliance offensive and defensive against all 
white people in the country," also prompted 
Macdonald's government toward the treaty 
process.8 
According to John Leonard Taylor, the 
treaties offered the Canadian government an 
alternative to the American experience, settle-
ment "without the danger of the Indian wars 
experienced in the United States." Taylor 
found that "events in the United States pro-
vided an example of what settlement could 
mean to Indians. Destruction of game, loss of 
territory, disease, and wars with American 
troops made the period a desperate one for the 
Indians of the Western United States."9 Cana-
dian Indians knew what had happened to 
American Indians and how Louis Riel had been 
forced to flee from Red River as well as of 
worsening fur trade relations and declining 
resources. Both the Indians and the govern-
ment entered into treaty negotiations with 
some urgency in 1871, hoping to avoid similar 
confrontations or destitution: 
"Peace, order, and good government," the 
phrase from the British North America Act that 
defined the powers of Canada's federal gov-
ernment, could apparently be served by nego-
tiating treaties with the Aboriginal nations of 
the North-West. Specifically, however, the 
government wished to get title to the land for 
as little as possible, to bring the Indians under 
Dominion control on reserves where they 
would not wreak havoc on prospective Euro-
Canadian settlers in the West, and to deliver 
them up to be "instructed, civilized and led to 
a mode of life more in conformity with the 
new position of this country, and accordingly 
[made into] good, industrious useful citizens 
. . . [who would] do without assistance from 
the government."IO This desire to establish 
peace and order-on Euro-Canadian terms-
is evident in an 1875 letter to the Reverend 
George McDougall from Lieutenant Gover-
nor Morris, requesting McDougall to proceed 
in telling the Crees about the upcoming treaty 
negotiations and to urge them to establish 
peace with other Indians and whites. ll 
Just as the Canadian government wanted a 
treaty, most of the Aboriginal {Indian and 
Metis) inhabitants wanted a treaty with the 
Crown. One could argue that the Blackfoot 
Confederacy wanted a treaty with ninawak, the 
Queen, or Chief Woman, but not every 
Blackfoot leader was an avid supporter of a 
treaty or even considered such a thing prior to 
1877. For instance, Edward Yellowhorn, Peigan 
elder and.son of the last traditional chief, said 
that when the North-West Mounted Police first 
arrived in Blackfoot territory they wanted to 
negotiate a treaty, but Bull Head (Peigan Chief 
who, according to Yellowhorn, died that win-
ter) refused and told the police that he would 
not give them any of his land, and that they 
would be permitted only to winter in his terri-
tory that year. 12 
Nonetheless, both oral and written accounts 
attest that the Blackfoot Confederacy wel-
comed the North-West Mounted Police and 
accepted their help in maintaining peace and 
order. 13 The majority of the Blackfoot leaders, 
particularly Crowfoot, soon agreed to "stop 
killing each other and not to kill white people 
that came into their territory."14 After a few 
"fairly peaceful" years, however, the situation 
began to worsen as the buffalo population de-
clined, traditional enemies such as the Crees 
and Metis encroached upon Blackfoot terri-
tory, and Euro-Canadians trickled in and 
settled on Blackfoot lands. IS As Leroy Little 
Bear suggests, the problem was quite simple: 
diminishing buffalo and First Nations intru-
sions into each other's hunting territories meant 
"there is more chances you're going to run into 
your enemy. Which would mean that there is 
sure to be battles, there is sure to be fights be-
cause they are going to want to protect their 
territory. What do we need to do? Make peace . 
See, so the Indian mind was talking about peace 
and good order and so on."16 
Thus, the Blackfoot chiefs at all levels of 
the Confederacy looked toward the North-
West Mounted Police and the Queen they rep-
resented for assurances that past promises 
would be kept and that peace would be main-
tained. They held numerous discussions with 
the police, missionaries, and the commander 
of the Canadian militia in which they dis-
cussed the problems arising in their territory 
and their desire to negotiate with the Queen 
measures to restrict other groups' access to 
their land as well as other matters concerning 
peace and justiceY 
The entire council of the Blackfoot Con-
federacy met to discuss the worsening situa-
tion and possible remedies including both war 
and peace. As a result of one such meeting, 
Jean L'Heureux drew up and sent a petition to 
Lieutenant Governor Morris on their behalf. 
This petition addresses Blackfoot grievances, 
requests that intruders be kept out of their ter-
ritory until a treaty is made, and urges the 
representatives of the Queen to negotiate a 
treaty that would ensure peace by limiting "the 
invasion of our Country" and keeping tradi-
tional enemies and Americans out. IS This pe-
tition, according to Hugh Dempsey, illustrates 
that the Blackfoot were "more concerned about 
Crees and Metis slaughtering buffalo in 
Blackfoot hunting grounds and white men 
building in their best wintering grounds than 
they were about the need for a treaty."19 Con-
cerns about territorial intrusion and depleting 
resources continued to echo in correspondence 
and discussions between missionaries, such as 
Father Constantine Scollen, and government 
officials, particularly Morris and Laird, well 
after the negotiation of Treaty Seven in Sep-
tember 1877.20 
The correspondence demonstrates that the 
Blackfoot were seeking assistance in main-
taining peace and order in their territory and 
often mentions the promise or treaty that Ed-
ward Yellowhorn referred to as having been 
made by the North-West Mounted Police. 
Although some of the writers mention will-
ingness on the part of the Blackfoot to share 
or even cede their land, the accuracy of this 
"documentation" is questionable as it contra-
dicts other written accounts and much, if not 
all, of the Blackfoot oral historyY Evidence 
is fairly conclusive that the Blackfoot sought 
TREATY SEVEN 89 
to negotiate a treaty that would lead to peace 
within Blackfoot society and within the en-
tire Blackfoot territory. The North-West 
Mounted Police would keep out settlers, en-
emies, and American traders. 
THE TREATY PERIOD 
Thus, while the government entered into 
the treaty negotiations in 1876 to obtain a 
land surrender, the majority of the Indians had 
no intention of surrendering any of their land 
but rather of gaining police assistance in keep-
ing the Crees and Metis out and in restricting 
buffalo hunting and the use of poison. 22 While 
the true intentions and the understandings of 
both parties to the treaty will continue to be 
questioned, negotiated, and mediated, the 
treaty was, in the words of the Reverend J. 
McDougall, 
a most notable event pregnant with far-
reaching consequences. [Notwithstanding 
the intentions and interpretations of each] 
the aboriginal man with his traditions un-
changed through the centuries [sic] met face 
to face representatives of another old but 
ever -changing race to negotiate in peace and 
friendship their future relations in this new 
land. 23 
According to John Taylor, "the government 
view of the treaty was that of an instrument 
of land surrender with provisions for a quid 
pro quo in terms of annuities, reserves of land, 
and other traditional items."24 Those sources 
written by agents of the government place 
very little emphasis on the peace and order 
clause. In fact, "the making of this treaty, 
which completed the series of treaties ex-
tending from Lake Superior to the slopes of 
the Rocky Mountains," was basically seen as 
a land surrender by the Dominion government 
in 1877.25 Nonetheless, although most of the 
treaty text detailed what the government 
would give the Indians for their traditional 
territories, the representatives of the Crown 
at least mentioned and explained {albeit 
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ambiguously) the mutual clause to their In-
dian counterparts. 
According to Morris, who relied primarily 
on Laird's first hand experience to create the 
most notable written account of the negotia-
tion of Treaty Seven, the commissioners ex-
plained to their "captive" Indian audience that 
they 
could not agree to exclude the Crees and 
Half-breeds from the Blackfoot country; that 
they were the Great Mother's children as 
much as the Blackfeet and the Bloods, and 
she did not wish to see any of them starve. 
Of course the Crees and Half-breeds could 
be prosecuted for trespassing on their re-
serves. In this the Indian Act secured them. 
The local government had passed a law to 
protect the buffalo. It would have a ten-
dency to prevent numbers from visiting their 
country in the close season. But to altogether 
exclude any class of the Queen's subjects, as 
long as they obeyed the laws, from coming 
into any part of the country, was contrary to 
the freedom which she allowed her people, 
and the Commissioners would make no 
promise of this kind. 26 
With this, the commissioners, at least accord-
ing to written history, excluded from the treaty 
all that the Blackfoot were seeking.27 Morris 
also (indirectly) indicates what the peace and 
order clause did not mean to the representa-
tives of the Crown. 
The Blackfoot sought protection of their 
lands and their lifestyle, but the government 
instead offered up the same peace and order 
clause that had appeared in the previous N um-
bered Treaties. As Laird explained, this treaty 
made the whites and Indians "brothers" under 
laws that had to be obeyed by both if they 
wished to remain as "brothers" and if the Indi-
ans wished to keep the North-West Mounted 
Police as friends and not foes. Lieutenant-
Colonel MacLeod similarly alluded to the 
meaning of this particular clause, stating, as 
he often had in the past, "the police will con-
tinue to be your friends, and be always glad to 
see you. On your part you must keep the 
Queen's laws, and give every information ro 
them in order that they may see the laws obeyed 
and offenders punished."z8 
The idea of peace and friendship that was 
advocated by the Queen's representatives was 
different from that articulated by the Blackfoot 
prior to the negotiation of the Treaty. Instead 
of viewing "peace and good order" in terms of 
"protecting" the Blackfoot and their territory, 
the government saw peace in terms of coloni-
zation and laws made by Parliament, applicable 
to a11, and enforced by the N orth-West 
Mounted Police, possibly with the assistance 
of tribal leaders when a Blackfoot person was 
suspected of breaking the law. In fact Treaty 
Seven was more restrictive than government 
officials had been as recently as 1874, when 
David Laird, as minister of the Interior, had 
written Morris suggesting that Aboriginal na-
tions, particularly the Metis, should be allowed 
to form their own government "within reason-
able limits," as long as they "treaded] every-
one fairly."29 Although written histories claim 
that the Blackfoot understood and agreed to 
the terms of the treaty in full, this is not so. 
Morris claims that the majority of the Chiefs 
spoke of their gratitude toward the North-West 
Mounted Police and their desire to have these 
friends stay in their territory on the same basis 
as before. Beyond this it is doubtful that the 
Indian adherents to the treaty understood it in 
anything like the same manner that the Euro-
Canadians did. 
In a letter Father Scollen asked Colonel 
A. G. Irvine of the North-West Mounted Po-
lice, "Did these Indians, or do they now, un-
derstand the real nature of the treaty made 
between the Government and themselves in 
1877? My answer to this question is unhes-
itatingly negative, and I stand prepared to sub-
stantiate this proposition. "30 This lack of 
agreement on the meaning of the treaty re-
sulted in part from problems of translation, 
the nonexistence of a Blackfoot equivalent 
for terms like "square mile," deliberate mis-
representation by representatives of the 
Crown, and the fact that the Blackfoot had a 
completely different world view from the Euro-
Americans.J1 Nor were the Treaty Seven Com-
missioners completely clear or truthful about 
their intentions, as can be seen in the follow-
ing statement by Laird: "In a very few years 
the buffalo will probably be all destroyed, and 
for this reason the Queen wishes to help you 
live in the future in some other way .... The 
Commissioners would strongly advise the In-
dians to take cattle ... at least as long as you 
continue to move about in your lodges."32 Laird 
never had in mind a pastoral herding life in 
which the Blackfoot Confederacy replaced the 
buffalo with domestic cattle-such a statement 
had no reference to reality. As Blackfoot po-
litical scientist Andrew Bear Robe put it, 
the Treaty 7 negotiations of 1877 between 
the treaty commissioners and the Indian na-
tions that signed that treaty talked about 
the need for peaceful co-existence and sec-
ondly, to let the Queen's white children 
come live on Indian lands. There was no 
talk about ending "the Indian way of life" 
which surely included the continuation of 
some form of Indian sovereignty and juris-
diction. 33 
The Blackfoot Confederacy did not discuss 
"white man's law," Indian sovereignty, juris-
diction over Blackfoot territory, and paternal-
istic government practices and structures 
because the people assumed that they would 
continue to live as they had since "time imme-
morial."34 Thus, the leaders of the Blackfoot 
Confederacy agreed to live in "peace and good 
order," a condition in which all people would 
live in peaceful co-existence, respecting oth-
ers' ways of doing things. White people would 
have to respect the "Indian way of life," as the 
Blackfoot did not expect to give up their sov-
ereignty nor their control of their territories. 
Many chiefs expected white settlers to respect 
and adapt to their ways, just as the Blackfoot 
had to Euro-Canadian ways, when the new way 
did not contradict or hobble their own.35 
The Blackfoot also saw the promise to main-
tain "peace and good order" and to abide by 
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the Queen's laws as a continuum with the past. 
According to Edward Yellowhorn it was the 
North-West Mounted Police that offered up 
this clause at the treaty negotiations, and it 
was with them that the Blackfoot agreed to es-
tablish and maintain "peace and good order." 
This idea was echoed in other interviews, par-
ticularly by Dorthy Yellowhorn, who suggested 
that this promise had been broken many times 
by the Police.36 These ill-defined promises, 
however, did not mean that the Blackfoot 
peoples agreed to stop living by their own laws 
or to supplant their own traditions with those 
of the incoming society. As James MacLeod 
wrote Lieutenant Governor Morris in 1875, the 
Mounted Police had been successful in sup-
pressing the whiskey traders, but the Blackfoot 
people's had no intention of cooperating with 
police attempts to prevent them from trading 
with whomever they wished or to stamp out 
polygamy and horse raidingY Rather, as 
Dempsey suggests, the Blackfoot respected Ca-
nadian laws only when they were compatible 
with and not contradictory to Blackfoot tradi-
tions. The Blackfoot Confederacy broke in-
compatible laws not to defy the Canadian 
authorities but to uphold triballaw.38 
Thus, the leaders of the Blackfoot Confed-
eracy, with no context for interpreting the in-
tent of distant authorities in Ottawa or for 
knowing that their promises would not be hon-
ored in a manner consistent with the "spirit 
and intent" of the treaty, assumed that the treaty 
meant they would continue to live as they had 
since the North-West Mounted Police had ar-
rived. According to Father Scollen, in fact, 
their friendly relationship of mutual co-exist-
ence with their "benefactors," the North-West 
Mounted Police, induced Blackfoot leaders to 
agree to the treaty. As Scollen states, "It may 
be asked: If the Indians did not understand 
what the treaty meant, then why did they sign 
it? Because previous to the treaty they had 
always been kindly dealt with by the Authori-
ties, and did not wish to offend them ... "39 
Neither the Blackfoot, nor the Cree (in their 
treaties), promised to give up their right to 
live in mutual coexistence according to their 
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own ways, or for that matter to control their 
territory. Rather, the "mutual clause" may be 
construed to have meant to the Blackfoot 
Confederacy that the Indian and Euro-Cana-
dian parties to Treaty Seven would coexist 
peacefully as sovereign entities with their own 
independent spheres of jurisdiction, assisting 
the others in maintaining peace and good or-
der when required and permitted by their own 
traditions. 
UNDERSTANDING THE TREATIES 
The peace and good order clause in Treaty 
Seven meant something different for all par-
ties involved. Regardless of what was stated or 
implied by the government agents at the nego-
tiations, the government did not view the mu-
tual clause (or the entire treaty) in the same 
manner as did the Aboriginal nations. The gov-
ernment viewed all the treaties as the first step 
in settling the West, and in "protecting," "civi-
lizing," and "assimilating" the Indians. For them 
the "mutual clause" represented the Indians' 
promise to remain peaceful, to obey Canadian 
laws, and to allow the government to exercise 
its authority and jurisdiction over the entire 
country.40 
On the other hand, the Siksika, Peigan, and 
Blood nations did not know of the Crown's 
intentions but viewed the treaty as a continua-
tion of past relations, as a means of securing 
government assistance in dealing with declin-
ing buffalo populations and outside hunters, 
and as a means of getting trade goods, helping 
them adjust to a new way of life, and sharing 
their land with relatively few farmers and ranch-
ers,41 The Indians did not view the treaty as a 
surrender of their land in exchange for recog-
nition of "treaty rights." They would instead 
establish (most likely through treaties) peace 
with all others, and they would share their ter-
ritory (with the very few white people they 
expected) in accordance with their ways, while 
respecting and abiding by the Queen's ways 
wherever possible. 
Despite the many different views of the 
peace and order clause, no one seems to have 
suggested a right to guaranteed electoral rep-
resentation, an idea that emerged in Cana-
dian politics only recently. The Canadian 
government expected to maintain a Euro-Ca-
nadian version of peace and order in the whole 
country, as Morris implied during negotia-
tions of Treaty Six at Fort PittY This govern-
ment assumption, however, contradicts the 
oral histories of the Aboriginal peoples and 
even the actions of the Dominion government 
in 1885, calling upon the Aboriginal popu-
lance to playa role in maintaining peace and 
good order in their respective territories. 
Furthermore, during the treaty negotiations, 
although there were many different issues 
raised by individual members and the con-
stituent bands and nations of the Blackfoot 
Confederacy, there is no recollection of any-
one's alluding to guaranteed parliamentary 
representation. For the most part, it seems that 
the Indigenous nations intended to retain their 
sovereignty and not interfere with the Euro-
Canadian government or settlers so long as 
they did not interfere with them. Thus, the 
clause represents a promise for the Siksika, 
Peigan, and Blood to uphold peace and order 
within their own territories, including the ter-
ritory they had agreed to share, and between 
themselves and others. The government prom-
ised to maintain peace and order in the re-
mainder of the country while respecting 
aboriginal laws and ways of being and seeing. 
Many Blackfoot present at the signing of 
Treaty Seven expected the government and 
any settlers to use resources according to 
Blackfoot customs, such as paying the Black-
foot for wood. They expected non-Natives to 
respect, obey, and abide by Blackfoot tradi-
tions, just as the Blackfoot would live under 
the Queen's law insofar as it did not interfere 
with their own ways. While the treaties es-
tablished a relationship of peace and friend-
ship and made promises of government 
assistance, neither party renounced its sover-
eignty, and the leaders of the Blackfoot Con-
federacy accepted the responsibility for 
maintaining peace and order in the territory 
they agreed to share. The leaders of these 
peoples took the added responsibility to 
"maintain peace and good order between ... 
themselves and others of Her Majesty's sub-
jects, whether Indians or whites, now inhab-
iting or hereafter to inhabit any of the said 
ceded tracts ... "43 
Although members of the Blackfoot Con-
federacy upheld "peace and order" every day, 
it is not clear that any individual or group ever 
attempted to hold any Euro-Canadian account-
able within traditional Blackfoot territories, 
although the Blackfoot had the right to do so. 
The government of Canada and some seg-
ments of the public recognized this right dur-
ing the North-West Rebellion in 1885, when 
they contemplated enlisting the Blackfoot 
Confederacy, including the Sarcees, to fight 
against the "rebelling" Plains Cree and Metis. 
According to Little Bear, this occurred 
basically because the Blackfoot have agreed 
not to go out and fight but we [the govern-
ment] may need them to go and fight. Be-
cause the Crees are their traditional enemies, 
let's let them fight against each other. We'll 
tell them that it won't affect your Treaty. 
That's the thinking behind that .... When 
they're looking at peace and order, they're 
looking at the larger picture. And saying 
that we've signed an agreement, and in that 
agreement we both said that we were going 
to keep peace and order. Those guys there 
are not behaving, so you have a responsi-
bility.44 
Except for using Sioux and Sarcee scouts, 
runners, and informants, however, the gov-
ernment did not employ Indians, particularly 
those of Treaty Seven, against the Cree and 
Metis. 45 Macdonald was unsure if "a body of 
Blackfeet [sic] under white command [could] 
be trusted," and he was concerned about the 
fear that would be sparked among settlers if 
large numbers of well armed Indians were al-
lowed to ride freely across the plains to the 
scene of combat. Finally, however, Mac-
donald ruled out the military assistance of the 
Blackfoot because although they were enemies 
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of the Cree, the Confederacy had divided over 
the Rebellion.46 
As a result, the government required Indi-
ans not involved in the Rebellion to pledge 
their loyalty to the Queen or accept soldiers 
stationed on their reserves to ensure they did 
not join the uprising.47 The government used 
the treaties to justify these actions, as did the 
chiefs who pledged their loyalty.48 Hugh A. 
Dempsey notes that it is unlikely the chiefs 
were actually pledging loyalty to the Crown, 
rather, "at all times [Crowfoot] was unswerv-
ingly loyal, not to the government, but to his 
own people. This was the only reason for re-
maining at peace."49 
While the government made some limited 
use of the "peace and good order" clause in 
1885, I believe that this is the only time that 
the clause was invoked to give Indians a role 
in reestablishing or maintaining peace and or-
der off their reserves. Nonetheless, the inter-
pretation of the clause providing Aboriginal 
nations with a role in maintaining peace and 
order is significant. 
The government was attempting to resolve 
the North-West Rebellion as quickly and as 
cheaply as possible, and without the loss of 
Euro-Canadian lives. Indians were inherently 
expendable in the colonial scheme of things 
because they were defined as a "vanishing" or 
"dying" race. Hence the government gave no 
thought to setting a precedent for twentieth 
century interpretations of the treaty. The Indi-
ans did not vanish, however, and they continue 
to exist today in a paternalistic and colonial 
paradigm. 
Although I lack information about the ori-
gins of the "peace and good order" clause, 
James Youngblood Henderson suggests that at 
the time of its first appearance in Treaty One, 
before the formation of the N orth-West 
Mounted Police, it was intended by the Co-
lonial Office of the imperial government to 
give responsibility for controlling the territo-
ries covered by each treaty to the Indians in 
order to ensure that they remained the allies of 
the Crown against the Americans. The Indians 
offered a less costly, and perhaps more efficient, 
94 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SPRING 1997 
way of controlling territory not yet open to 
Euro-Canadian settlement than did the systems 
of control utilized by the United States or by 
the Hudson's Bay Company.50 But while the 
government may have viewed this as a tempo-
rary measure, since the Indians did not vanish 
or die out, the treaty of 1877 is still a working 
agreement, though one that has yet to be fully 
understood and implemented. Such an under-
standing is not simple, however, especially if 
one is applying the "Dickson Doctrine," stan-
dards established by the Canadian courts that 
hold that treaties must be interpreted as mean-
ing whatever they could reasonably have been 
expected to mean to the Indians at the time of 
signing. 51 
The Blackfoot Confederacy did not believe 
that they were ceding their land, their control 
over their territory, or their sovereignty. Re-
gardless of what the government had intended 
and what policies and practices were imple-
mented subsequent to the signing of Treaty 
Seven, the Siksika, Peigan, and Blood, and 
other signatory nations retained their sover-
eignty and their ability and right to govern 
themselves according to their laws. They also 
accepted the added responsibility for helping 
to maintain peace and good order throughout 
their traditional territory. The onslaught of 
Euro-Canadian settlers and the demise of the 
buffalo meant that the Blackfoot Confederacy 
was never really able to practice this shared 
power, but the Canadian government acknowl-
edged it to some extent during the North-West 
Rebellion. 
While the peace and order clause was prob-
ably not properly translated nor fully explained 
at the treaty negotiations, the wording of the 
clause is, for the most part, compatible and 
consistent with the Indian view. In Treaty 
Seven, the Blackfoot promised to make and 
keep peace with all others living within the 
Confederacy's traditional territory, a pledge 
consistent with the idea that this was a peace 
treaty to ensure peaceful relations between 
"friends" or "brothers" who would share land, 
trade goods, and responsibilities but not sov-
ereignty. Blackfoot promises to "obey and abide 
by the law" have to be understood in the con-
text of the negotiations and the reality of the 
time. Oral histories show that the Indian sig-
natories did not fully understand the univer-
sal coverage of white law or that their laws 
would be supplanted by it. The Blackfoot 
would respect the Queen's law whenever pos-
sible, as they had been doing and newcomers 
to their territories would respect their laws. 
The Blackfoot Confederacy also promised to 
help enforce that law ("they will assist the of-
ficers of Her Majesty in bringing to justice 
and punishment any Indian"), clearly assum-
ing a shared responsibility for maintaining 
peace and order with the North-West Mounted 
Police. 
Determining exactly what the understand-
ing means today is even more problematic 
because according to a paper prepared for 
and distributed by the research branch of the 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development (DIAND) the federal govern-
ment has agreed that, "if the Treaty promises 
are read as symbolic promises of more com-
prehensive services to be adapted to changing 
circumstances, they take on a very different 
meaning than if they are read as plain state-
ments meaning precisely and exactly what they 
say."52 While it would be easier to claim that 
the treaty is merely what appears on the page, 
this is not the Indian view of the treaty, and 
the Indians have been upheld by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
Most of the people interviewed for this pa-
per reported that the treaties were never fi-
nalized, and although their promises could 
never be retracted or lessened, they should 
continue to adapt to change. The statement: 
"so long as the sun shines, [grass grows] and 
the rivers flow" does not actually appear in 
the Numbered Treaties, though it, or a simi-
lar version, appears constantly in the speeches 
of Indians and non-Indians alike, and it is 
actually included in the 1855 treaty between 
the Blackfoot Confederacy and the United 
States governmentY According to Henderson, 
however, this statement is representative of 
Indian reality and philosophical traditions. It 
is the "natural context that they are talking 
about; they knew and experienced that .... 
Those aren't metaphors, those were the actual 
ways that they talked for the environment ... 
and themselves-living with nature and not 
making a distinction, a theory, of self."54 
The Indigenous peoples were speaking from 
their own reality, their own understanding of 
the world around them, one very different 
from the western ways of the dominant society. 
If we understand the "Rivers Flow" statement 
as a crucial expression of Indian philosophy 
rather than a rhetorical flourish, it mandates 
that the treaties, like the river, are not con-
stant but something in an ever changing cycle 
of life. The water in the river one moment 
was not the same the next moment. In dry 
years the river was shallow while in other years 
it flooded. What was constant was that this 
ever changing river continued to flow and 
modify or adapt itself, as was needed, to a 
changing reality. Before the building of huge 
twentieth century dams Alberta's Indigenous 
people believed no person could make a river 
do what it did not want to do. Thus the huge 
floods of 1995 came as no surprise to many 
elders. The rivers are just reasserting them-
selves. 
Many Blood, Peigan, and Siksika people 
consider that much like a river, the treaty con-
tinues to exist and will continue to exist for as 
long as can be envisioned, even though many 
promises, like the rivers, have been dammed. 
But like the river, Treaty Seven should change 
with time to meet the needs of the people, the 
same people (human and non-human beings) 
for which this land was created. Promises such 
as those concerning keeping peace and good 
order have to be interpreted to reflect the situ-
ation today: The N orth-West Mounted Police 
no longer exist and their successors are no 
longer solely responsible for maintaining peace 
and order on the Prairies, and the traditional 
territories of the Blackfoot Confederacy are 
"occupied" by "settlers" who do not respect 
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traditional laws, traditional ways of being, or 
the sovereignty of First Nations. Other clauses 
in treaties have been modernized in this spirit. 
For instance a clause in Treaty Six promising 
a "medicine chest" to each group has been 
interpreted as guaranteeing free health and 
dental care to all status Indians across Canada, 
regardless of which, if any, treaty covers the 
individual. 
While the "river analogy" provides a basis 
for change, the belief that the treaty was never 
finalized provides an alternate argument for 
updating the treaty promises. This belief is 
common throughout "Blackfoot Country," 
partly because Crowfoot, purposely, never 
marked his "X" to it and because the Num-
bered Treaties merely allow for the sharing of 
Indian lands, remaining silent on most other 
matters.55 Thus, the existing treaties could ei-
ther be modernized to deal with such issues as 
the sharing or imposition of jurisdiction and 
sovereignty (for example through guaranteed 
Parliamentary representation), or new treaties 
could be drafted to deal with such issues.56 
Nonetheless, as Bear Robe states, even if 
the treaties are not revisited, they are stillliv-
ing documents that include usable rights that, 
as in the case of self-government, have lain 
dormant. 
Since the Indian treaties in Canada are all 
silent as to the matter of continuing politi-
cal and sovereign relations between the In-
dian Nations and the British sovereign, the 
contemporaneous right to First Nation [Par-
liamentary representation] may be an "ex-
isting" treaty right pursuant to section 35 of 
the Canadian ConstitutionY 
Thus, even though the peace and order clause 
is silent about particularistic representation, 
it does not mean that there is no treaty right 
to guaranteed representation. This parallels 
the more familiar argument that the peace 
and order clause can be construed to suggest 
a treaty right to self-government, as there is 
no mention of the Dominion government 
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supplanting the sovereign governments of the 
Indian nations. While there is no mention of 
guaranteed representation, there is mention 
of a responsibility to maintain peace and good 
order throughout traditional Blackfoot terri-
tories, a responsibility at present carried out 
by the federal and provincial governments and 
their various agencies, which implicitly ex-
clude First Nations. The Blackfoot Confed-
eracy is now prevented from exercising a 
responsibility specifically reserved to it by the 
treaty. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRESENT 
The Blackfoot Confederacy never viewed 
the treaty as relinquishing their sovereignty or 
their jurisdiction within their traditional lands 
but rather in terms of sharing and as a means 
of securing help in dealing with the demise of 
the buffalo and the advent of Euro-Canadian 
settlers. For many, including Crowfoot, the 
treaty offered hope for the future, a vision of 
the future different from the starvation pre-
dicted by many elders. It was a dream in which 
the Queen would look after them and teach 
them her ways. 
J ames Youngblood Henderson reiterated 
the importance of the peace and good order 
clause: 
It's very important that you understand that 
in the oral tradition it's the last thing that 
you agree upon [that] is most important. Be-
cause none of the other agreements are bind-
ing if you don't agree with the last clause. 
So if you're a literate person in English you 
go, "What's number one?" ... But in an oral 
tradition, it's the last story that you agree to 
that bundles the whole negotiations up. And 
that last thing that they, [the Indians 1, agreed 
to is that they'd be in control of all the ceded 
territory. So their governments would remain 
just like they were, except they would have 
a little more responsibility than they would 
ordinarily have over their people .... And 
there is nothing in the Treaties about how 
the white people are going to govern them-
selves .... They aren't going to govern any-
thing-if you just read the Treaties. 58 
While one might argue that this inter-
pretation of the mutual clause does not seem 
compatible with the government view of the 
treaties one could as easily argue that the gov-
ernment view could be construed to support 
this conclusion. In the early 1870s (both be-
fore and after the creation of the North-West 
Mounted Police) the Dominion of Canada was 
searching to establish peace and good order in 
their newly acquired and "unoccupied" re-
source-rich hinterland. Ottawa wanted to avoid 
the mistakes made by the United States or the 
Hudson's Bay Company, and govern at mini-
mal cost. Thus they entered into treaties of 
"mutual" peace, friendship, land surrender, and 
assistance with the Indigenous nations. 
According to Henderson, such treaties se-
cured peaceful relations with the Native popu-
lace, but they were also an attempt to control 
"uninhabited" territory at minimal cost. Thus, 
while the imperial Crown's prime objective 
was to arrange peaceful land surrenders with 
the First Nations and avoid "Indian wars," the 
peace and good order clause confirmed Na-
tive peoples in temporary control of their lands 
and resources to ward off claims from the US, 
to secure Euro-Canadian access to resources 
and, in time, to give way to the new settlers. 
Henderson claims that, apparently, the Colo-
nial Office of the imperial government "de-
vised a prototype of all colonial documents, 
that also is no less of authority in British law 
than the grants to the House of Commons, the 
House of Lords or the Courts." In fact the peace 
and good order clause may have originally have 
been intended to function as did the Peace, 
Order, and Good Government clause (Indians 
already had Good Government) in the British 
North America Act of 1867. Both are overrid-
ing clauses that provide the foundation upon 
which to govern. As Wilton Littlechild points 
out, however, this may be interpreted as Indi-
ans agreeing to abide by Canadian law. None-
theless, he says that "our people will still say 
no, we agreed to obey and abide by our law."59 
It looks as if the Crown agreed to have the 
chiefs and minor chiefs either share the respon-
sibility for, or be solely responsible for, main-
taining peace and good order, if only among 
their own peoples and as a temporary measure. 
The leaders of the Blood, Peigan, and Siksika 
nations had the shared responsibility of main-
taining peace and good order throughout their 
"ceded" (shared) territories. The Crown 
"granted" this responsibility, presumably as a 
temporary measure and possibly one meant to 
be shared with the North-West Mounted Po-
lice and, to a small extent, the Dominion gov-
ernment.60 
Like a river, however, the prairies have been 
changed and altered. Settlement occurred, co-
lonial governing structures (i.e., provinces) 
were created, the N orth-West Mounted Police 
disbanded and were recreated as the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, treaty promises 
were broken, and the federal government's In-
dian policy was implemented. Nonetheless, this 
clause still holds true, even though it has long 
been forgotten. Many Blackfoot still retain 
their interpretation of the responsibilities out-
lined in the treaty-including the responsibil-
ity to maintain peace and good order in their 
traditional territories -and continue to argue 
that much of what the government has done 
has been against the spirit and intent of the 
treaty. 
Despite the fact that the promise outlined 
in the last clause in Treaty Number Seven was 
never fully implemented, the Blackfoot Con-
federacy retain their sovereignty and their re-
sponsibility to maintain peace and good order 
throughout their respective traditional territo-
ries. Given that their lands are now "occu-
pied" and the North-West Mounted Police 
are no longer responsible for the maintenance 
of peace and good order, this promise cannot 
be viewed as it was at the time of the treaty, 
but the promise still stands, even though its 
exact implications are unclear. 
The peace and good order clause really 
makes two major promises to the Blackfoot 
Confederacy. The first implies they will keep 
their sovereignty while the second promises 
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that the chiefs and minor chiefs will share the 
responsibility to maintain peace and order. 
While the first of these has often been con-
strued as the recognition of an inherent right 
to self-government, the promise entails more 
than that. It is a recognition of sovereignty, 
and a recognition of the Indigenous signato-
ries' understanding that they would go on liv-
ing according to their laws, customs, and 
traditions without interference from the 
Queen, except to help them adapt to a new 
way of life and to assist them wherever re-
quired. Aboriginal nations still retain sover-
eignty within the reserve, but outside the 
reserve sovereignty and jurisdiction, though 
limited by promises made in the treaty still 
exist in some form. According to Henderson, 
The chiefs and headmen delegated limited 
authority to the proper legislative authority 
or federal government over alcohol and to 
the "Government of the ceded country" in 
harvesting of natural resources in the shared 
or ceded land .... [The hunting, trapping 
and fishing rights] section shows that First 
Nations knew how to delegate authority to 
other governments. Lacking such affirma-
tive language, no implied authority exists 
in the Crown. As the treaties illustrate, the 
imperial Crown authority over First Nations 
and the shared territory is derivative, not 
inherent.61 
While the "mutual clause" may be seen as a 
recognition of sovereignty and the right to self-
government (possibly on and off reserve), the 
clause also entails promises to share in the re-
sponsibility to maintain peace and good order 
throughout the ceded or shared territories. 
While we can partially reconstruct what this 
meant in 1877, the exact meaning of the clause 
today is difficult to determine. It is no longer 
possible for the chiefs and minor chiefs to 
assist the North-West Mounted Police, and 
the traditional ways of the Blackfoot Confed-
eracy cannot be recreated. Nevertheless, the 
"mutual clause" guarantees Aboriginal signa-
tories the right and responsibility to share in 
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maintaining peace and good order, a right held 
by the respective nations and exercised by the 
leaders. This treaty right could be implemented 
in a plethora of ways, but implementation must 
adhere to the spirit and intent of the promise 
as well as the treaty in its entirety. 
Although establishing bilateral nation-to-
nation relationships between the Crown and 
the leaders of the Blackfoot Confederacy would 
be the ultimate manner in which to imple-
ment the right, this is highly unlikely, as is 
allowing the Indigenous leaders to enforce 
traditional laws amongst the non-Native popu-
lace or even their own peoples. A more plau-
sible alternative would be the construction of 
a system of particularistic representation that 
respects the nature of the nation-to-nation 
relationship and the spirit and intent of the 
Treaty. This need not exclude other possible 
plans of implementation, such as developing 
self-government or partnerships in the admin-
istration of justice, or the co-management of 
resources. 62 
What the treaty guarantees is not explicit 
parliamentary representation but rather a suit-
ably modernized way for the .Blackfoot Con-
federacy to share in the maintenance of peace 
and good order. Parliamentary representation 
is a plausible mechanism for the respective 
communities to share responsibility. This could 
also be achieved through the creation of a 
separate but parallel parliament or even the 
recreation of the Senate, turning it from an ap-
pointed body from the dominant culture to a 
council of the signatories of the Numbered 
Treaties or possibly all Aboriginal peoples. 
Parliamentary representation is desirable 
because the true governing body of today is 
the federal government or, in some cases, the 
provincial government, not the North-West 
MountedPolice that implemented the laws in 
the 1870s. Since dominant society has failed 
to respect the laws or ways of the Indigenous 
peoples today, as was suggested in the early 
interpretations of the treaties, a new relation-
ship that respects Indigenous ways has to be 
constructed. Although one may argue that par-
ticipation in an "alien" parliament is con-
trary to the promise of sovereignty and a na-
tion-to-nation relationship, this does not have 
to be the case. Sovereign nation states have 
participated, as nations, in shared structures 
of governance. There are numerous examples 
of political confederacies (including the Black-
foot Confederacy and the Iroquois Confed-
eracy) that existed long before colonization, 
and sovereign nation-states such as Britain 
participate in various forms of "alien" gov-
ernmental structures including the European 
Parliament, the United Nations, and the 
Commonwealth. A system of differentiated 
parliamentary representation could be struc-
tured that respected Aboriginal nations within 
Canada and re-established nation-to-nation 
relationships with the Canadian nation-state. 
A system that recognizes the existence of na-
tions and enables the Siksika, Blood, and 
Peigan, and Tsuu T'ina and Stoney nations to 
share in the responsibility for maintaining 
peace and order, particularistic representation 
would be a contemporary adaptation of Treaty 
Seven. The recognition of nationhood, sov-
ereignty, shared responsibility, and a nation-
to-nation relationship must be the underlying 
principles of a system of guaranteed represen-
tation., 
Although particularistic representation 
might at first consideration appear to be pro-
hibited by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, as a treaty right, it is entrenched in 
the Constitution. The Canadian Constitution 
not only affirms treaty and aboriginal rights in 
Section 35, but it also provides in Section 25 
that the Charter "shall not be construed so as 
to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, 
treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain 
to the aboriginal peop Ie of Canada ... "63 Thus 
Aboriginal people are "citizens plus," whose 
"special" rights are constitutionally shielded 
from other citizens and protected against the 
Charter's sphere of influence. Although a treaty 
right to guaranteed parliamentary representa-
tion-or even the treaty promise of a mutual 
responsibility for peace and good order-is 
not explicitly recognized in the Constitution, 
neither are other treaty rights enumerated 
constitutionally. The argument of this paper 
has been that guaranteed representation is a 
plausible and practical way of activating a 
major Treaty Seven promise that has lain dor-
mant since 1877. 
Based upon the concept presented above, 
one can justifiably state that a treaty right to 
parliamentary representation is constitution-
ally permissible, as it is a constitutionally 
entrenched right. This conclusion is not revo-
lutionary or unsubstantiatable, as several 
scholars and all of the national Aboriginal 
political organizations have asserted that guar-
anteed representation is a treaty and Aborigi-
nal right. Even the Royal Commission on 
Electoral Reform and Party Financing at-
tempted to construct such an argument when 
they reported that 
Since Section 25 of the Charter places Ab-
original people in a special constitutional 
position, there is no valid reason to believe 
the establishment of such a right to direct 
representation through a well crafted pro-
cess whereby they could vote in Aboriginal 
constituencies would not survive any chal-
lenge in the courts that sought to demon-
strate that this right had a negative impact 
on the equality rights of other Canadians.64 
I have not attempted to suggest how such a 
system of representation could be constructed 
or how the rights of the signatories to Treaty 
Seven should affect other Aboriginal nations 
and individuals in Canada. I have, however, 
endeavored to show how, in the context of 
today's conditions, the Treaty Seven clause ac-
knowledging that the mutual responsibility for 
peace and good order of the "shared" or 
"ceded" territories lay with both the Aborigi-
nal and Euro-Canadian adherents can be con-
strued as leading to guaranteed parliamentary 
representation for Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada. 
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